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Abstract 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are mainly a mechanism used in the Latin American banking 
industry to carry out business consolidation. This paper focuses on the effect of M&A 
announcements on stocks of Latin American banks and their rivals between 2000 and 2019. We 
evaluate two impacts of M&A announcements: impacts on cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) 
and impacts on event-induced variance (EIV). We use the GARCH-based event-study method. 
We find that acquirers and target banks have a statistically significant CAR, however, the sign is 
inconclusive. Rivals of acquirers and targets are not affected by M&A announcements. In 
general, we observe that EIV is negative for acquirers, targets, and rivals. Finally, we estimate a 
multivariate GARCH model to isolate the effects of co-movements of volatility between the 
acquirer and the target, and we find that the results remain qualitatively equal.  
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Introduction  
In the past few decades, the banking industry has engaged in consolidation mainly through 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As) (Amel, Barnes, Panetta, & Salleo, 2004; Weiß, Neumann, & 
Bostandzic, 2014). From the 1980s to the 2010s, M&A activity in the banking industry, measured 
by the average number of announcements per year, grew by 37% around the world.5 As a result, 
both academics and practitioners have become interested in this issue (Buch & DeLong, 2004; 
Di Giovanni, 2005). Therefore, the literature has evaluated two impacts of deals: those on 
acquirers and target banks (e.g., efficient gain, abnormal returns, bank risk profile) and those on 
their rivals (e.g., market power and risk changes).6 Understanding how markets react to these 
events is important for both shareholders and regulators. On the one hand, shareholders need 
to have information that allows them to comprehend whether M&As in the banking sector 
destroy or generate value to make better investment decisions. On the other hand, policy makers 
need to know how business decisions can affect the performance of the market as a whole. 
Most studies have been carried out in developed economies (Lebedev, Peng, Xie, & Stevens, 
2015). However, the empirical evidence shows the impact of M&As on company stocks can be 
different in emerging countries than in developed countries. For instance, Goddard, Molyneu, 
and Zhou (2012) study the effect of M&A announcements on acquirer shareholder wealth and 
point out that in the US and Europe, the bank M&As create value, while in Latin America and 
Asia they do not. This might be attributable to differences in the institutional environments, 
corporate governance policies, and the financial markets between emerging markets and 
developed economies (Burns & Liebenberg, 2011; Lebedev et al., 2015). 
                                                 
5 Thomson Reuters Eikon. 
6 For a comprehensive review of M&As in the banking industry, see Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan (1999) and 
De Young et al. (2009).  
Therefore, this paper contributes to the literature by focusing on M&A activity by Latin 
American banks because of great interest in the region in obtaining synergy through the 
consolidation of the industry. Between the 1980s and the 2010s, M&A activity in the banking 
industry, measured by the average number of announcements per year, grew by 116.5%.7 
However, as mentioned above, the effects may be different in emerging economies. Specifically, 
one relevant issue in M&As is the effect of announcements in terms of creating value for 
shareholders and their possible impact on stock volatility (Elyasiani, Staikouras, & Dontis-
Charitos, 2016; Hankir, Rauch, & Umber, 2011; Houston & Ryngaert, 1994; Humphery-Jenner, 
Sautner, & Suchard, 2017; Hutson & Kearney, 2001; Nain & Wang, 2016; Piloff & Santomero, 
1998). Thus, this paper has two goals: first, to quantify whether M&A announcements generate 
abnormal returns for the acquirer, the target, and rival banks; second, to measure whether M&A 
announcements create market volatility due to evidence about acquirers, targets, and rivals. 
In that respect, a large proportion of the financial literature about M&As focuses on the 
performance of the firms involved in the deals and the impact on their stakeholders 
(Alexandridis, Antypas, & Travlos, 2017; Cortés, García, & Agudelo, 2015; De Young, Evanoff, 
& Molyneux, 2009; Jensen & Ruback, 1983). Performance is generally evaluated in market terms, 
i.e., how M&A announcements affect firm securities. M&A announcements are events that 
incorporate new information about firms that are directly or indirectly involved in this process. 
This information modifies both the return and the volatility of firms (Carroll & Kearney, 2015). 
Therefore, the empirical literature has evaluated the two effects of M&As: on the creation of 
value for shareholders and on market volatility. This evaluation is generally conducted separately 
(Alexandridis et al., 2017; Amihud, DeLong, & Saunders, 2002; Bozos, Koutmos, & Song, 2013; 
                                                 
7 Thomson Reuters Eikon. 
Chang & Cho, 2017; Eckbo, 1983; Humphery-Jenner et al., 2017; Nain & Wang, 2016; Song & 
Walkling, 2000). 
First, concerning the quantification of the creation of value in the aftermath of the M&A 
announcements, the empirical evidence is inconclusive. For instance, Houston and Ryngaert 
(1994) find that M&As generate negative abnormal returns for acquirer banks, positive abnormal 
returns for target banks, and zero return for the net deal (Return target + Return acquirer). 
Nonetheless, Goddard et al. (2012) identifies that in bank M&As, acquirers have zero abnormal 
returns while targets have positive abnormal returns. Akhigbe and Madura (2001) find positive 
and significant valuation effects for publicly traded acquirer and target insurance companies. In 
general, the positive effects can be explained by the market power obtained by firms due to the 
deal, the reduction in information asymmetry about companies, and improvement in corporate 
governance policies (Alexandridis et al., 2017; Hankir et al., 2011; Humphery-Jenner et al., 2017); 
whereas the negative effects are related to irrational or behavioral motivations (Cortés et al., 
2015; Gugler, Mueller, & Weichselbaumer, 2012; Shleifer & Vishny, 2003) and to personal 
motivations of managers that are not in line with the interests of shareholders (Fama, Fisher, 
Jensen, & Roll, 1969; Jensen, 1986; Kosnik & Shapiro, 1997). Therefore, we conclude that deals 
involving strategic decisions or that generate synergy for companies participating in M&As 
correspond to events that create value for shareholders. Other motivations may have the 
opposite effect. 
Concerning the impact of M&A announcements on rivals, the empirical literature shows the 
opposite results. Studies pose different theoretical explanations for positive abnormal returns by 
rivals. Eckbo (1983) studies whether positive abnormal returns by rivals in horizontal M&As can 
be explained by an increase in the likelihood of successful collusion among rivals. He finds that 
positive abnormal returns by a target’s rivals are independent of whether the government 
declares the M&As deal a violation of antitrust laws. This shows that positive abnormal returns 
are explained by the efficient production hypothesis and not by the collusion hypothesis. 
Similarly, Shahrur (2005) finds that when M&As generate value (combined target and acquirer) 
the rivals show positive abnormal returns, but if it destroys value, the rivals have negative 
abnormal returns. This behavior depends on whether the M&As generate efficiency gains. In 
contrast, Hankir et al. (2011) and Nain and Wang (2016) show that this effect is caused by the 
market power that acquirers and targets gain because of the deal. Another justification for 
positive abnormal returns by rivals is signaling theory. Akhigbe and Madura (1999, 2001), 
Akhigbe and Martin (2000), and Song and Walkling (2000) postulate that rivals of target firms 
obtain positive abnormal returns because after M&As announcements, the probability that the 
rivals will become targets increases.  
Second, the impact of M&As on the volatility of acquirers, targets, and rivals in the bank industry 
has also been researched. Most of the literature shows a reduction in the volatility of stock 
returns. This may be due to the convergence in the diversity of opinions of the market operators 
on stock prices of acquirers, targets and rivals. After M&As announcements, market operators 
have more information about the intrinsic value of the companies involved in the deal. This 
causes opinions on the company's stock price to converge, which leads to an decrease in volatility 
(Chang & Cho, 2017; Elyasiani et al., 2016; Gelman & Wilfling, 2009; Hutson & Kearney, 2001). 
However, an increase in volatility could result either because of the unclear purpose of the deal 
or because of the rise in the concentration of market power (Amihud et al., 2002; Bozos et al., 
2013; Casu, Dontis-Charitos, Staikouras, & Williams, 2016; Elyasiani et al., 2016). Although the 
literature focuses on the effects of the M&A announcements on shareholder wealth for 
acquirers, targets, and rivals, the impact on volatility has been explored less. In fact, to our 
knowledge, this is the first paper to study the effect of M&As on volatility in the banking industry 
in Latin American countries. 
We use a GARCH event study to estimate the impact of M&A announcements not only on the 
mean return but also on variance (Wang, Salin, Hooker, & Leatham, 2002).  We model bank 
stock returns with two equations: one for conditional mean and one for the conditional variance. 
For the first, we use the market model plus a dummy variable to estimate cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR). For the conditional variance equation, we use a GARCH(1,1) model plus a 
dummy variable to estimate the event-induced variance (EIV). 
This allows us to identify how the financial market reacts to M&A announcements and the 
individual effect it generates on the acquirer, the target, and rivals’ stocks. To generalize 
conclusions about the effect of M&A announcements in the Latin American banking industry, 
we conduct two cross-sectional tests to identify whether the estimated effect on each event can 
be generalized at the country level, i.e., whether the average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR) 
and the average event-induced variance of each country are significantly different from zero. 
Finally, we estimate a multivariate model of conditional volatility for three events in the sample 
in which both the acquirer and the target are publicly owned banks. We seek to isolate co-
movements among bank returns generated by the dynamic in the industry to show that the EIV 
generated for M&A announcements do not change because of the possible transfer of volatility 
between the acquirer and the target. 
In general, we find that at the country level, the ACAR cross-sectional test is not significant. 
However, we observe that CARs of acquirers are significant in 83% of the cases, of which 49% 
have a positive sign and 51% have a negative sign. We show that the acquirers' rivals are not 
affected by the M&A announcements whereas the targets' rivals have positive or negative effects 
depending on the country. 
Regarding the impact on variance, we find that the cross-sectional test is negative for most 
countries. This test is significant for acquirers and rivals in Brazil and Colombia. We cannot 
estimate the cross-sectional test for the targets, because of the limited number of events per 
country. The test results of the rivals are not significant in any event. 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the sample construction process and shows 
the design of the event study. Section 3 presents a discussion about results. We present a 
robustness multivariate analysis in Section 4. Finally, we conclude in Section 5. 
Methodology 
Data 
The information concerning M&A announcements for five Latin American countries (Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru) between January 1, 2000, and June 30, 2019, come from the 
Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters EIKON databases. Our initial database contained 257 
announcements. Table 1 lists the number of deals in which a Latin American bank is the acquirer 
or target by country and year. Panel A shows that in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the banking 
industry experienced a peak in M&A activity. During this period, Latin American countries 
carried out financial liberalization, which led banks to look for opportunities to become more 
competitive in a more globalized environment, and many of them found M&As a way to achieve 
it (Daniel & Jones, 2007). Panel B shows that during periods of financial crisis as the early 2000s 
and between 2007 and 2008, purchases of Latin American banks exceeded those than in other 
periods. 
Table 1. M&A announcements in the Latin American banking industry by country, 2000-2019 
Panel A: by acquirer 
Country  2000-2001 2002-3 2004-5 2006-7 2008-9 2010-11 2012-13 2014-15 2016-17 2018-19 Total 
Brazil  12 22 12 8 20 14 13 12 7 5 125 
Chile  1 2 0 2 0 1 3 3 5 2 19 
Colombia  0 1 7 4 1 2 5 1 0 0 21 
Mexico  1 1 1 0 1 4 2 5 2 0 17 
Peru  2 2 0 1 2 3 1 2 0 4 17 
Total  16 28 20 15 24 24 24 23 14 11 199 
Panel B: by target 
Country  2000-2001 2002-3 2004-5 2006-7 2008-9 2010-11 2012-13 2014-15 2016-17 2018-19 Total 
Brazil  6 7 1 0 8 1 1 2 3 1 30 
Chile  2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 8 
Colombia  1 0 3 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 8 
Mexico  2 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 7 
Peru  0 1 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 5 
Total  11 11 5 2 10 4 2 4 5 4 58 
 
Table 2 presents the number of deals according to the type of deal: domestic or cross-border. 
Panel A shows that 76% of the purchases by Latin American banks are domestic (deals between 
companies in the same country). The remaining 24% are purchases by regional companies (in 
Latin America) and other parts of the world. Panel B shows the type of deal in which a Latin 
American bank is a target. Note that 68% of the deals are domestic deals, while the remaining 
32% are cross-border deals.  
Table 2. M&A announcements by Latin American banks by type of deal, 2000-2019 
Panel A: by acquirer 
Country 2000-2001 2002-3 2004-5 2006-7 2008-9 2010-11 2012-13 2014-15 2016-17 2018-19 Total 
Domestic  13   28   19   11   20   16   14   15   12   5   153 
Cross-border  3   0   1   4   4   8   10   8   2   6   46  
Total  16 28 20 15 24 24 24 23 14 11 199 
Panel B: by target 
Country 2000-2001 2002-3 2004-5 2006-7 2008-9 2010-11 2012-13 2014-15 2016-17 2018-19 Total 
Domestic  6   8   4   2   9   3   0   3   2   3   40 
Cross-border  5   3   1   0   1   1   2   1   3   1   18 
Total 11 11 5 2 10 4 2 4 5 4 58 
 
Finally, we filtered our sample using the following criteria, which are usually applied in the M&A 
literature: 
• We excluded leveraged buyouts (LBOs), spin-offs, recapitalizations, repurchases, and 
government privatization.  
• Acquirers or targets are public banks listed on any of the stock exchanges of the selected 
countries. 
• The announcement must be the first news to the public. 
• The acquirer or target has not missed returns during the event window.8 
We obtain a database of 126 announcements of which 116 concern an acquirer that is a Latin 
American public bank and 8 of which are target banks. Only in three of them are both the 
acquirer and target Latin American listed banks. Regarding rivals, we select firms that meet these 
criteria and have a SIC code between 6000 and 6200. We obtained the following data from 
Bloomberg: daily stock prices of acquirers, targets, and rivals and the daily stock market index 
of each country.9  
Methodology 
The event-study method enables us to estimate the effect that an event has on firms' securities 
(Fama et al., 1969; MacKinlay, 1997). However, traditional event studies only estimate abnormal 
returns of stocks around M&A announcements (Akhigbe & Madura, 2001; Alexandridis et al., 
2017; Amihud et al., 2002; Balaban & Constantinou, 2006; Eckbo, 1983; Elyasiani et al., 2016; 
Goddard et al., 2012; Hankir et al., 2011; Houston & Ryngaert, 1994; Humphery-Jenner et al., 
2017). Because the objective of this article is to analyze the effect of M&A announcements on 
the mean and variance of bank returns, we conduct a GARCH event study, which allows us to 
estimate the impact of M&A announcements on stocks' mean and variance of acquirer, target, 
and rival banks. 
                                                 
8 Following Cortés et al. (2015) and Savickas (2003). 
9 BOVESPA in Brazil, IPSA in Chile, COLCAP in Colombia, IPC in Mexico, and IGBVL in Peru.   
Following Balaban and Constantinou (2006), Goddard et al. (2012), and Savickas (2003), we use 
a canonical model as follows: equation 1 is the mean equation, in which returns are explained 
for the market model, and equation 2 is the conditional variance, which is modeled with 
GARCH(1,1).10 The full model is as follows: 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = α𝑖𝑖 + β𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀,𝑡𝑡 + γ𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + ϵ𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ϵ𝑖𝑖 ∼ 𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛(0,ℎ𝑖𝑖) (1) 
ℎ𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖ϵ𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−12 + 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + δ𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (2) 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the daily return of bank 𝑖𝑖 on day 𝑡𝑡, 𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀,𝑡𝑡is the index market return of the country 
where the deal takes place, 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if 𝑡𝑡 is in the event 
window, and 0 otherwise. ℎ𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the conditional variance of 𝑖𝑖 on day 𝑡𝑡, and ϵ𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the random 
innovations. α𝑖𝑖 ,β𝑖𝑖, δ𝑖𝑖 , 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖, and 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 are parameters to estimate. Coefficient γ𝑖𝑖 is the cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR), and δ𝑖𝑖 is the EIV.  
We determine an event window of 520 days, 260 days before and after the event window. We 
use two event windows: the announcement day [0,0] and two days around the announcement 
day [-1,1]. We use the shortest event windows to avoid capturing effects generated by other types 
of events (Balaban & Constantinou, 2006; Goddard et al., 2012; Leledakis & Pyrgiotakis, 2019). 
Also, we calculate two cross-sectional tests by country to identify how M&A announcements 
affect acquirers' stocks, targets' stocks, and their rivals' stocks as a whole. Employing these tests, 
we estimate the statistical significance of the M&A announcement effect on the mean and 
variance of bank returns. Following Savickas (2003), we use 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡1(γ�) to compare the null 
hypothesis that the average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR) is different from 0: 
                                                 















where 𝑁𝑁 is the number of M&A announcements, and 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = γ𝑖𝑖/�ℎ𝚤𝚤,𝑡𝑡� .  
We use the cross-sectional t-statistic 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡2�δ�� posed by Balaban and Constantinou (2006). With 
this test, we evaluate whether the variance of banks’ stock changes during the event window, i.e., 















where 𝑁𝑁 is the number of M&A announcements, 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 = δ𝚤𝚤�/σ𝚤𝚤� , and 𝜎𝜎𝚤𝚤� is the standard deviation of 
daily conditional volatility for each bank 𝑖𝑖. 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡1 and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡2 distribute Student-t with 𝑁𝑁 − 1 
degrees of freedom. 
Results 
Acquirers 
In this subsection, we present results for acquirer banks from Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, 
and Peru. Table 3 shows CAR and EIV for 116 deals in which the acquirers are Latin American 
listed banks. Column 5 reports the estimates of acquirer CAR for the event window [0.0],11 
showing that 93% of the events have a statistically significant CAR; 49% of the deals report a 
                                                 
11 We report only the results for the event window [0,0], and the results of the events window [-1,1] are 
qualitatively the same. 
positive sign, which can be interpreted as a signal of value creation for shareholders; and 51% 
of the deals are negative, which signals that they destroy value, or the market does not consider 
them strategic for companies. 
In column 7, we report the EIV for the event window [0,0]. We found that in 47% of the M&A 
announcements, the impact on the volatility of acquirer stocks is statistically significant. 
However, the direction of the effect is not always the same, and 83% of the significant 
coefficients are negative. From the theoretical and empirical point of view, the impact of M&A 
announcements on stock volatility depends on the interaction between the positive and negative 
effects of the deal (Amihud et al., 2002; Bozos et al., 2013; Casu et al., 2016). On the one hand, 
the synergy and profits that the deal may generate create uncertainty about the future of the 
company, which may increase stock volatility, but, on the other hand, the new information 
provided by announcement of the deal may cause investors' opinions about the price of the 
acquirer's stock to converge, which reduces volatility (Elyasiani et al., 2016).  
Table 3. Cumulative Abnormal Returns and Event-Induced Variance of Acquirers, 2000-2019 
Country  Acquirer  Event day  Target  CAR [0,0]  p-value  EIV [0,0]  p-value 
Brazil  Unibanco, Uniao de Bancos Brasileiros 02-28-2000  Banco Credibanco 0.0202 *** (0.0000) -0.0002 ** (0.0363) 
Brazil  Banco Bradesco 04-28-2000 Banco Boavista Interatlantico 0.0738 *** (0.0000) -0.0001 (0.3784) 
Brazil  Unibanco, Uniao de Bancos Brasileiros 07-03-2000 Banco Bandeirantes  0.0301 *** (0.0000) -0.0006 *** (0.0000) 
Brazil  Itau Unibanco Holding 12-14-2000 LineInvest.com  -0.0078 *** (0.0000) -0.0002 (0.1003) 
Brazil  Unibanco, Uniao de Bancos Brasileiros 12-19-2000  Banco Fininvest -0.0326 ** (0.0494) 0.0003 *** (0.0000) 
Brazil  Banco Bradesco 03-27-2001  BCN Alliance Capital Management 0.0039 *** (0.0017) -0.0001 (0.5082) 
Brazil  Unibanco, Uniao de Bancos Brasileiros 08-27-2001  Banco Investcred -0.0002 *** (0.0000) -0.0004 *** (0.0000) 
Brazil  Itau Unibanco Holding 10-04-2001  Lloyds TSB Asset Management  0.0225 *** (0.0000) -0.0001 (0.5184) 
Brazil  Banco do Brasil 11-30-2001  Max Blue Americas  -0.0159 *** (0.0000) -0.0007 *** (0.0000) 
Brazil  Itau Unibanco Holding 12-21-2001  Banco Sudameris Brasil  -0.0334 *** (0.0000) -0.0001 (0.7563) 
Brazil  Banco Bradesco 01-14-2002  Banco Mercantil de São Paulo 0.0275 *** (0.0000) -0.0002 (0.1432) 
Brazil  Banco Bradesco 02-25-2002  Banco Cidade 0.0232 *** (0.0000) -0.0000 (0.6331) 
Brazil  Itau Unibanco Holdings 05-13-2002  Banco Brascan -0.0090 ** (0.0234) 0.0001 (0.4615) 
Brazil  Itau Unibanco Holdings 11-05-2002  Banco BBA Creditanstalt  -0.0081 *** (0.0000) -0.0001 (0.2948) 
Brazil  Itau Unibanco Holdings 12-03-2002  Banco Fiat  -0.0187 *** (0.0000) -0.0002 (0.3056) 
Brazil  Banco Bradesco 01-13-2003  Banco Alvorada 0.0060 *** (0.0000) -0.0001 (0.4228) 
Brazil  Itau Unibanco Holdings 06-10-2003  Banestado, Banco BEG, and Banco Bemge  -0.0049 *** (0.0000) -0.0001 (0.6303) 
Brazil  Banco do Brasil 09-26-2003  Maxblue DTVM  -0.0561 *** (0.0000) -0.0001 (0.4021) 
Brazil  Banco Bradesco 11-07-2003  Banco Zogbi 0.0167 *** (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.5458) 
Brazil  Unibanco, Uniao de Bancos Brasileiros 11-18-2003  Creditec Financiamento e Investimento -0.0033 *** (0.0000) -0.0001 ** (0.0252) 
Brazil  Unibanco, Uniao de Bancos Brasileiros 03-01-2004  Hipercard  0.0053 *** (0.0000) -0.0001 *** (0.0000) 
Brazil  Unibanco, Uniao de Bancos Brasileiros 06-16-2004 Banco BNL do Brasil -0.0352 *** (0.0000) -0.0001 * (0.0618) 
Brazil  Itau Unibanco Holding 11-08-2004  Orbitall  -0.0110 *** (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.6278) 
Brazil  Unibanco, Uniao de Bancos Brasileiros 06-03-2005  Banco Dibens 0.0192 *** (0.0000) -0.0000 (0.6892) 
Brazil  Itau Unibanco Holding 05-02-2006  Bankboston Brazil  0.0234 *** (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.6038) 
Brazil  Banco Bradesco 05-15-2006  Bradesplan Participacoes  0.0003 *** (0.0000) 0.0002 *** (0.0000) 
Brazil  Itau Unibanco Holding 11-28-2006  BankBoston Trust and BankBoston International  0.0005 *** (0.0000) -0.0001 *** (0.0000) 
Brazil  Banco Bradesco 01-24-2007  Banco BMC  -0.0008 (0.2821) -0.0000 (0.8147) 
Brazil  Banco Bradesco 01-22-2008  Mediservice  -0.0489 *** (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.7165) 
Brazil  Banco Bradesco 03-06-2008  Agora Holdings -0.0184 *** (0.0000) -0.0001 *** (0.0004) 
Brazil  Banco do Brasil 07-07 -2008 Cia de Seguros Alianca do Brasil  -0.0258 *** (0.0000) 0.0002 (0.5024) 
Brazil  Banco Bradesco 09-04-2008 Leader S/A Administradora de Cartoes de Credito  0.0191 *** (0.0000) 0.0006 ** (0.0463) 
Brazil  Itau Unibanco Holding 11-03-2008  Unibanco, Uniao de Bancos Brasileiros 0.1239 *** (0.0000) -0.0005 (0.1520) 
Brazil  Unibanco, Uniao de Bancos Brasileiros 11-26-2008  Unibanco AIG Seguros -0.0000 (0.9558) -0.0007 *** (0.0045) 
Brazil  Banco Industrial e Comercial 11-03-2009  Sul FinanceiraCredito Financiamentos e Investi  -0.0155 *** (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.9788) 
Brazil  Banco Bradesco 02-02-2009  Europ Assistance Brasil  -0.0087 ***  (0.0000) 0.0001  (0.6418)  
Brazil  Banco Bradesco 06-05-2009  Banco ibi  -0.0051 ***  (0.0000)  -0.0001  (0.1828)  
Brazil  Banco do Brasil 10-27-2009  Brasilprev Seguros e Previdencia -0.0022  (0.1329)  0.0001  (0.1790)  
Brazil  Itau Unibanco Holding 11-13-2009  XL Seguros Corporativos  0.0187 ***  (0.0000)  -0.0000  (0.4387)  
Brazil  Banco Bradesco 01-22-2010  Ibi Mexico  0.0046 ***  (0.0000)  -0.0005 ***  (0.0000)  
Brazil  Banco Bradesco 04-06-2010  ITP Partners  -0.0101 ***  (0.0000)  -0.0000  (0.2777)  
Brazil  Banco do Brasil 12-15-2009 Banco Patagonia 0.0003  (0.1466)  0.0000  (0.8148)  
Brazil  Banco do Brasil 05-05-2010  Brasilveiculos Cia de Seguros  0.0054 ***  (0.0000)  0.0001  (0.4820)  
Brazil  Banco Bradesco 01-26-2011  Companhia Brasileira de Solucoes e Servicos  0.0032 ***  (0.0000)  -0.0001 ***  (0.0000)  
Brazil  Banco do Brasil 04-25-2011  EuroBank  -0.0038 ***  (0.0008)  -0.0000  (0.4169)  
Brazil  Banco Bradesco 05-20-2011  Banco do Estado do Rio de Janeiro -0.0063 ***  (0.0000)  -0.0001 **  (0.0137)  
Brazil  Banco Indusval 06-16-2011 Guide Investimentos Corretora de Valores  -0.0053 ***  (0.0000)  -0.0002 ***  (0.0000)  
Brazil  Itau Unibanco Holding 02-07-2012  Redecard 0.0024 ***  (0.0000)  -0.0000 ***  (0.0000)  
Brazil  Itau Unibanco Holding 08-09-2012  Financeira Americanas  -0.0092 ***  (0.0000)  -0.0001 ***  (0.0000)  
Brazil  Banco Indusval 02-19-2013  Voga Empreendimentos e Participacoes  -0.0011 ***  (0.0000)  -0.0001 ***  (0.0000)  
Brazil  Itau Unibanco Holding 05-14-2013  Banco Citicard  0.0036 ***  (0.0000)  -0.0000  (0.1347)  
Brazil  Itau Unibanco Holding 06-17-2013  CAT Administradora de Tarjetas 0.0108 ***  (0.0000)  0.0000  (0.8768)  
Brazil  Banco Indusval 06-26-2013  Banco Intercap 0.0059  (0.2339)  0.0007 *  (0.0789)  
Brazil  Itau Unibanco Holding 06-27-2013 BMG Seguradora 0.0115 ***  (0.0000)  -0.0000  (0.1673)  
Brazil  Banco Bradesco 10-15-2013  Odontoprev -0.0133 ***  (0.0000)  -0.0000  (0.8288)  
Brazil  Banco Santander Brasil 04-07-2014  GetNet  0.0241 ***  (0.0000)  -0.0008 ***  (0.0000)  
Brazil  Itau Unibanco Holding 08-04-2014  Munita Cruzat and Claro 0.0012 ***  (0.0000)  -0.0003 ***  (0.0000)  
Brazil  Itau Unibanco Holding 09-10-2014  Maxipago Servicos de Internet -0.0014 ***  (0.0000)  -0.0001  (0.3661)  
Brazil  Banco Bradesco 12-09-2014  2bCapital 0.0225 ***  (0.0000)  0.0001  (0.6039)  
Brazil  Parana Banco 12-11-2014  Cardinal Cia de Seguros 0.0093 ***  (0.0060)  -0.0005 **  (0.0279)  
Brazil  Banco Daycoval 12-12-2014  Banco Commercial Investment Trust do Brasil  0.0055 **  (0.0244)  0.0002  (0.2779)  
Brazil  Banco Bradesco 08-03-2015  HSBC Bank Brasil  -0.0132 ***  (0.0000)  0.0001  (0.2113)  
Brazil  Itau Unibanco Holding 12-30-2015  Recovery do Brasil Consultoria 0.0063 ***  (0.0000)  0.0000 ***  (0.0000)  
Brazil  Banco Santander Brasil 03-14-2016  ContaSuper  0.0177 ***  (0.0000)  -0.0001  (0.3259)  
Brazil  Itau Unibanco Holding 09-29-2016  Banco Itau Consignado -0.0072 ***  (0.0000)  -0.0000  (0.9106)  
Brazil  Banco Santander Brasil 06-13-2017  Banco Original -0.0069 ***  (0.0000)  0.0000  (0.9626)  
Brazil  Banco Santander Brasil 08-08-2017  Ipanema  0.0238 ***  (0.0000)  -0.0007 ***  (0.0000)  
Brazil  Banco Bradesco 10-01-2018  Fidelity Processadora -0.0014 ***  (0.0000)  -0.0001 ***  (0.0000)  
Brazil  Banco Bradesco 10-02-2018  RCB Investimentos 0.0112  (0.2044)  0.0001 ***  (0.0000)  
Brazil  Banco Bradesco 05-06-2019  BAC Florida Bank  -0.0146 ***  (0.0000)  -0.0000  (0.7599)  
Chile  Banco de Chile  08-08-2001  Banco de A Edwards  -0.0024 ***  (0.0004)  0.0001  (0.7812)  
Chile  Banco Santander Chile  05-07-2002  Banco Santiago  0.0017 ***  (0.0002)  -0.0006 ***  (0.0000)  
Chile  Banco de Credito e Inversiones  11-18-2003  Banco Conosur 0.0020 ***  (0.0000) 0.0000  (0.7160) 
Chile  Banco de Chile  12-04-2007  Legg Mason Chile Administradora General de Fondos  -0.0019 ***  (0.0000) -0.0002 ***  (0.0000) 
Chile  Banco de Chile  06-29-2007  Citibank Agencia de Valores 0.1309 ***  (0.0000) -0.0000  (0.8655) 
Chile  Corpbanca  12-06-2011  Banco CorpBanca Colombia -0.0149 ***  (0.0000) -0.0001  (0.3104)  
Chile  Corpbanca  10-09-2012  Helm Bank 0.0036 ***  (0.0000) 0.0001  (0.5779)  
Chile  Banco de Credito e Inversiones  05-24-2013  City National Bank of Florida  -0.0368 ***  (0.0000)  0.0001  (0.1130)  
Chile  Corpbanca  01-29-2014  Banco Itau Chile -0.1230 ***  (0.0000)  -0.0002 **  (0.0281)  
Chile  Banco de Chile  07-10-2015  Banco Penta  0.0024 ***  (0.0031)  0.0000  (0.2849)  
Chile  Banco de Credito e Inversiones  12-01-2017  TotalBank  -0.0198 ***  (0.0003)  -0.0004 ***  (0.0000)  
Chile  Banco de Credito e Inversiones  12-19-2017  Credit Card Operations Walmart Chile  -0.0094  (0.1195)  0.0002 ***  (0.0012)  
Chile  Corpbanca  05-29-2019  MCCCorredores de Bolsa  -0.0213 ***  (0.0000)  0.0000  (0.9659)  
Colombia  BanColombia 2003-09-03  Cia Suramericana de Financiamiento Comercial -0.0013 ***  (0.0011)  0.0000  (0.7875)  
Colombia  Banco de Bogota 2005-01-03  BankBoston Colombia  -0.0045 ***  (0.0000)  0.0001 ***  (0.0000)  
Colombia  BanColombia 2004-09-14  Corp Financiera Nacional y Suramericana 0.0222 ***  (0.0000)  0.0002  (0.5843)  
Colombia  BanColombia 2005-12-12  Comercia -0.0011 ***  (0.0000)  -0.0001 ***  (0.0000)  
Colombia  Banco de Bogota 2006-03-16  Megabanco 0.0202 ***  (0.0000)  -0.0003 ***  (0.0000) 
Colombia  BanColombia 2006-12-22  Banagricola 0.0121 ***  (0.0012)  -0.0001  (0.1619)  
Colombia  Helm Bank 2010-06-22  Helm Leasing -0.0096 ***  (0.0000)  -0.0002 ***  (0.0000)  
Colombia  Banco Davivienda 2012-01-24  Banco HSBC from El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Honduras  -0.0138 ***  (0.0041)  -0.0005 ***  (0.0000)  
Colombia  BanColombia 2012-08-30  UFF! Mobile SAS  -0.0123 ***  (0.0000)  -0.0001 ***  (0.0000)  
Colombia  BanColombia 2013-02-19  Banistmo 0.0012 ***  (0.0000)  -0.0001 *  (0.0916)  
Colombia  Banco Davivienda 2013-11-15  Corredores Asociados  0.0168 ***  (0.0000)  -0.0001  (0.5707)  
Colombia  BanColombia 2015-12-30  Grupo Agromercantil Holding  0.0081 ***  (0.0000)  -0.0002 ***  (0.0000)  
Mexico  Grupo Financiero Banorte   2009-06-10  Ixe Afore  -0.0576 ***  (0.0000)  -0.0010 ***  (0.0000)  
Mexico  Grupo Financiero Inbursa 2010-06-04  Chrysler Financial Services de Mexico 0.0015  (0.6054)  -0.0002 **  (0.0251)  
Mexico  Grupo Financiero Banorte  2010-10-19  IXE Grupo Financiero SAB  0.0088 ***  (0.0000)  -0.0002 ***  (0.0000)  
Mexico  Gentera SAB  2011-03-28  Compartamos Financiera 0.0096 ***  (0.0000)  -0.0002 ***  (0.0000)  
Mexico  Grupo Financiero Banorte   2013-06-11  Pensiones Banortede and Seguros Banorte -0.0166 ***  (0.0000)  -0.0001  (0.6735)  
Mexico  Banco Santander Mexico 2013-06-14  ING Hipotecarias de Mexico  0.0030 ***  (0.0007)  0.0008  (0.1368)  
Mexico  Grupo Financiero Inbursa 2014-03-14  Banco Standard de Investimentos -0.0061 ***  (0.0000)  0.0000  (0.6075)  
Mexico  Gentera 2014-10-16  Pagos Intermex  0.0038 ***  (0.0000)  0.0000  (0.9591)  
Mexico  Regional  2014-11-20  Arrendadora Capita Corp  -0.0043 ***  (0.0000)  -0.0002 ***  (0.0000)  
Mexico  Grupo Financiero Inbursa 2014-12-18  Banco Wal-Mart de Mexico Adelante 0.0055 ***  (0.0069)  -0.0001  (0.1483)  
Mexico  Gentera  2015-03-23  Compartamos Financiera 0.0022 ***  (0.0047)  -0.0001 ***  (0.0026)  
Mexico  Grupo Financiero Banorte  2017-10-25  Grupo Financiero Interacciones -0.0638 ***  (0.0000)  0.0002 **  (0.0252)  
Peru  Credicorp  2006-07-24  AFP Union Vida 0.0100 ***  (0.0000)  -0.0003 ***  (0.0000)  
Peru  Scotiabank Peru 2008-05-20  Banco del Trabajo  0.0112 ***  (0.0000)  -0.0002 **  (0.0470)  
Peru  Credicorp  2010-10-21  El Pacifico Vida Cia de Seguros y Reaseguros -0.0077 ***  (0.0000)  -0.0002 ***  (0.0000)  
Peru  Credicorp  2011-07-01  La Esperanza del Peru and San Isidro  -0.0014 ***  (0.0000)  -0.0003 ***  (0.0000)  
Peru  Credicorp  2012-04-24  Inversiones IMTrust -0.0056 **  (0.0109)  0.0001  (0.4612)  
Peru  Credicorp  2014-02-10  Mibanco Banco de la Microempresa 0.0213 ***  (0.0000)  0.0000  (0.9864)  
Peru  Credicorp  2019-03-27  Multicaja 0.0022 **  (0.0126)  -0.0003 ***  (0.0000)  
Peru  Credicorp  2019-04-23  Correval Panama -0.0576 ***  (0.0000)  0.0001 ***  (0.0013)  
Peru  Credicorp  2019-06-28  Banco Compartir -0.0102 **  (0.0213)  -0.0000  (0.5252)  
CAR = cumulative abnormal return, EIV = event-induced variance. Leveraged buyouts (LBOs), spin-offs, recapitalizations, repurchases, and government privatization 
are excluded. ***, **, and * represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively 
 
Table 4 presents the results of cross-sectional 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡1 (equation 3) and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡2 (equation 4) for the 
event window [0,0] and [−1,1] by country. In general, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡1 is not statistically significative. 
This result suggests that, at the country level, these strategies do not produce abnormal returns, 
and we can infer that M&As do not create or destroy value for stockholders of acquirer banks 
between 2000 and 2019. Goddard et al. (2012) find bank M&As in Latin American countries do 
not generate value for shareholders in the period 1998 to 2010. These results are also consistent 
with those reported by Leledakis and Pyrgiotakis (2019) for US banks between 1990 and 2014. 
In the event window [−1,1], the results are robust. However, in Chile, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡1 shows a marginally 
significant result at the level of 10%.  
But the AEIV is negative in all cases. According to Hutson and Kearney (2001), this is because 
investors have more information about the intrinsic value of the stock, thus leading to better 
price formation and less volatility. 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡2 is statistically significantly different from zero in Brazil 
and Colombia. 
Table 4. Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns and Average Event-induced Variance of 
acquirers: Cross-sectional test 
Country n 
[0,0] [-1,1] 
ACAR AEIV ACAR AEIV 
Brazil  70  0.0021  -8.91e-05***  0.0013  -1.93e-05*  
    (0.2890)  (0.0038)  (0.2987)  (0.0588)  
Chile  13  -0.0068  -7.89e-05  -0.0033*  -7.58e-05  
    (0.3370)  (0.7246)  (0.0947)  (0.7599)  
Colombia  12 0.0032  -1.05e-04  0.0020  -4.36e-05*  
    (0.3311)  (0.1141)  (0.3216)  (0.0707)  
Mexico  12  -0.0095  -8.30e-05  0.0009  -4.69e-05  
    (0.2077)  (0.8765)  (0.8153)  (0.3297)  
Peru  9  -0.0043  -1.01e-04  0.0039  -6.31e-05  
    (0.3815)  (0.1336)  (0.2836)  (0.7064)  
This table reports estimates of cross-sectional tests for acquirers by country: 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡1 for average cumulative abnormal 
returns (ACAR) and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡2 for average event-induced variance (AEIV). 𝑛𝑛 is the number of M&A announcements 
between 2000 and 2019. The p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
Table 5 shows the results of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡1 and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡2 for the rivals of acquirers. 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡1 suggests that in 
general M&As do not affect the rivals of the acquirers. At the country level, ACAR is different 
from zero. 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡2 that AEIV is negative in all cases, however, it is only significant in Brazil and 
marginally in Colombia. From these results, we infer that after M&A announcements, the rivals' 
stock price converges to their intrinsic value, which leads volatility to decrease (Chang & Cho, 
2017; Elyasiani et al., 2016; Gelman & Wilfling, 2009; Hutson & Kearney, 2001).  
Table 5. Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns and Average Event-induced Variance of 
acquirers' rivals: Cross-sectional test 
Country n 
[0,0] [-1,1] 
ACAR AEIV ACAR AEIV 
Brazil 70  0.0021 -8.91e-05***  0.0013  -1.93e-05* 
  (0.2890)  (0.0038)  (0.2987)  (0.0588) 
Chile  13  -0.0068  -7.89e-05  -0.0033  -7.58e-05 
  (0.3370)  (0.7246)  (0.0947)  (0.7599) 
Colombia  12  0.0032  -1.05e-04  0.0020  -4.36e-05* 
  (0.3311)  (0.1141)  (0.3216)  (0.0707) 
Mexico  12  -0.0095  -8.30e-05  0.0009  -4.69e-05  
   (0.2077)  (0.8765)  (0.8153)  (0.3297)  
Peru  9  -0.0043  -1.01e-04  0.0039  -6.31e-05  
   (0.3815)  (0.1336)  (0.2836)  (0.7064)  
This table reports estimates of cross-sectional tests of acquirers' rivals by country: 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡1 for average cumulative 
abnormal returns (ACAR) and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡2 for average event-induced variance (AEIV). 𝑛𝑛 is the number of M&A 
announcements between 2000 and 2019. The p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * significant at 10%, 5%, and 
1%, respectively. 
Targets 
In this section, we present the results for Latin American target banks in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
and Mexico.12 The price information on a large proportion of target banks is not available, as, 
after an M&A, the target is often delisted. For this reason, the number of events decreases more 
than the number of acquirers. 
Table 6 shows the CAR and EIV for Latin American target banks. We observe statistically 
significant CAR with both negative and positive signs. The finance literature often finds that 
                                                 
12Peru does not have events that can be analyzed taking into account the criteria that we apply. 
targets have a positive CAR, as deals generally generate synergies and increase efficiency at 
targets (Akhigbe & Madura, 2001; Hankir et al., 2011). However, some evidence indicates that 
when deals are carried out under conditions of uncertainty and inefficiency, the targets may have 
a negative CAR (Cortés et al., 2015). We found that in three deals, the target's CAR is negative. 
According to Bloomberg news, the three agreements involved problems related to favoring one 
of the participants, undervaluation of the stocks, and difficulties in the negotiation. This is one 
possible reason that the market views these transactions negatively. 
Table 6. Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) and Event-Induced Variance (EIV) of targets, 2000-2019 
Country Acquirer Event day  Target  CAR [0,0] p-value EIV [0,0] p-value 
Brazil Itau Holding  11-03-2008 Unibanco, Uniao de Bancos Brasileiros  0.0581 *** (0.0000) 0.0007 (0.4617) 
Brazil Banco BTG Pactual  01-31-2011 Banco Panamericano  -0.0271 *** (0.0000) -0.0156 *** (0.0000) 
Brazil China Construction Bank 10-31-2013 Banco Industrial e Comercial  0.0023  (0.3620) -0.0052 *** (0.0000) 
Chile Quinenco  12-13-2000 Banco de Chile  -0.0726 *** (0.0000) -0.0106 (0.6615) 
Chile Banco de Chile 08-08-2001 Banco de A Edwards  0.0728 *** (0.0000) 0.0008 (0.1500) 
Colombia BanColombia  09-14-2004 Corfinsura  0.0606 *** (0.0000) 0.0008 (0.1236) 
Colombia Corpbanca 10-09-2012 Helm Bank  -0.0151 *** (0.0000) -0.0006 *** (0.0000) 
Mexico Gentera  09-05-2011 Banco Compartamos  0.0012 (0.8495) 0.0011 (0.2039) 
Leveraged buyouts (LBOs), spin-offs, recapitalizations, repurchases, and government privatizations are excluded. ***, ** and * significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively.
Table 7 lists the results of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡1 and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡_2 for the targets' rivals. In general, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡1 shows that 
M&A announcements do not affect the value of rival stocks. We observe that in Colombia, 
ACAR is negative and significantly different from zero. This indicates that, on average, the deals 
carried out in this country generated losses in value for rival banks. This may be a consequence 
of increased synergies or gains in market power that the target obtains with the transaction 
(Shahrur, 2005). 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡2 reveals that AEIV is negative in all cases, and the results are qualitatively 
similar to those for the acquirer. 
Table 7. Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns and Event-induced Variance of targets' rivals: 
Cross-sectional test 
Country n [0,0] [-1,1] ACAR AEIV ACAR AEIV 
Brazil  25  0.0099  -1.18e-03  0.0051  -4.17e-05  
    (0.2857)  (0.2405)  (0.2859)  (0.8447)  
Chile  4  0.0077  9.61e-05  0.0050  4.73e-05  
    (0.1236)  (0.7831)  (0.3360)  (0.4178)  
Colombia  4  -0.0036  -4.10e-05  -0.0024*  2.31e-06  
   (0.2069)  (0.1389)  (0.0318)  (0.9963)  
Mexico  8  0.0108*  -1.67e-04*  0.0021  -1.05e-04  
    (0.0604)  (0.0775)  (0.7293)  (0.1945)  
This table reports estimates of cross-sectional tests for targets' rivals by country: 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡1 for average cumulative 
abnormal returns (ACAR) and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡_2 for average event-induced variance (AEIV). 𝑛𝑛 is the number of M&A 
announcements between 2000 and 2019. The p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, * significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
Multivariate Analysis 
Stylized facts in financial returns show that volatility between assets and markets is correlated 
(Wang et al., 2002). Consequently, we present a multivariate representation of the GARCH 
model to isolate the effect of the M&A announcement on the volatility of the acquirer and target 
stock of co-movements between two banks. The canonical model proposed by (Bollerslev, 
Engle, & Wooldridge, 1988) is described below: 








where 𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 is the variance-covariance matrix, 𝐶𝐶 is a diagonal 𝑛𝑛 × 𝑛𝑛 matrix, 𝐴𝐴 and 𝐵𝐵 are diagonal 
matrices. 𝜖𝜖 is an 𝑛𝑛 × 1 vector of random innovations. 𝐴𝐴 measures the effect of 𝑝𝑝  random 
innovations’ lags on the variance, which means the effect of the news, and 𝐵𝐵 measures the impact 
of  𝑞𝑞 variance’s lags on variance in 𝑡𝑡. 
 We use the bivariate diagonal VEC (1,1) representation with exogenous regressors 𝛾𝛾, which 
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where the coefficients 𝑎𝑎11 and 𝑎𝑎22 measure the lagged effect of news from the same asset, and 
𝑎𝑎12 is the effect of asset 2 news on asset 1 variance. 
The coefficients 𝑏𝑏11 and 𝑏𝑏22 measure the impact of the lagged volatility from the same asset, 
whereas 𝑏𝑏12 is the impact of the lagged volatility of asset 2 on asset 1. 𝑥𝑥1 and 𝑥𝑥2 are dummy 
variables that take a value of 1 if 𝑡𝑡 is in the event window, and 0 otherwise. The coefficients γ1 
and γ2 measure the impact of the M&A announcement on the variance of assets 1 and 2, 
respectively. It is assumed that the sign of these coefficients is negative for both the acquirer and 
the target, for the reasons mentioned earlier. 
ϵ is an 𝑛𝑛 × 1 vector of random innovations that distributes the t-Student multivariate with 𝑣𝑣 
degrees of freedom, mean μ, and variance 𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡. We use the t-Student distribution because it 
accommodates the heavy tails of returns better than the normal distribution. In this way, we 
improve the capacity for adjustment and convergence of the maximum likelihood function.  












where the parameters are combined into vector 𝜃𝜃 =
(𝐶𝐶′,𝑣𝑣𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐(𝐴𝐴1)′, . . . , 𝑣𝑣𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐(𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞)′,𝑣𝑣𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐(𝐵𝐵1)′, . . . , 𝑣𝑣𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐(𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝)′) 
Table 8. Event-induced variance: a multivariate GARCH model 
Acquirer   Unibanco   Banco de Chile   Bancolombia  
Target   Itau   Banco de A Edwards   Corfinsura  
𝑐𝑐1   0.00014   0.00025*   0.00005  
   (0.0001)  (0.0001)   (0.0001)  
𝑐𝑐2   0.00008   0.00000   0.00000  
   (0.0001)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
c3  0.00014   0.00019   0.00001*  
   (0.0001)   (0.0001)   (0.0000)  
𝑎𝑎11  0.04108   0.80778   0.04033  
   (0.0357)   (0.5151)   (0.0398) 
𝑎𝑎12  0.05374**   -0.18820   0.03621  
   (0.0256)   (0.236)   (0.0432) 
𝑎𝑎22  0.03771   0.35581   0.08156**  
   (0.027)   (0.2799)   (0.0369) 
𝑏𝑏11  0.56720   0.13787*   0.54781  
   (0.4101)   (0.0813)   (0.4978)  
𝑏𝑏12  0.60904***   0.53513   0.56034  
   (0.2344)  (0.5503)   (0.6838) 
𝑏𝑏22  0.55985   0.56738***   0.86541***  
  (0.4043) (0.1777) (0.0535) 
γ1  -0.00022   -0.00031   -0.00014  
   (0.0005)   (0.0018)   (0.0003) 
γ2  -0.00022   0.00659   0.00011  
   (0.002)   (0.0191)   (0.0042)  
This table reports estimates of a multivariate diagonal VEC model. We estimate for the event windows [0,0]. The 
standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Only three deals in the total sample involve both an acquirer and a target that are public banks: 
Itau Unibanco, Banco de Chile-Banco de A Edwards, and Bancolombia-Corfinsura. Therefore, 
we use these three events for the multivariate estimate. Table 8 shows the results of the 
multivariate VEC model. We found volatility transmission between Banco Itau and Unibanco. 
Coefficient 𝑎𝑎12 is statistically different from zero, which implies that Itau Bank's news affects 
Unibanco Bank's volatility. Coefficient 𝑏𝑏12 is also statistically different from zero, which shows 
that Itau Bank's volatility affects Unibanco Bank's volatility. However, after isolating this effect 
in the multivariate model, we found that the dummy coefficients of the event are not significant, 
and their magnitude does not differ significantly from the univariate estimate.  
We found no evidence of transmission of volatility between the acquirer and target in the other 
two events. The significance and magnitude of γ1 and γ2 do not change significantly with respect 
to the univariate estimates. Given these facts, we can infer, at least regarding the events studied 
here, that even with joint estimates the effects of the announcement of M&As on the volatility 
of targets and acquirers remain qualitatively the same. 
Conclusions 
We studied the implications of M&A announcements on banks in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico, and Peru between 2000 and 2019. We analyze the effects of these announcements on 
the mean and variance of returns from the acquirer, target, and rival stocks. For this purpose, 
we use a GARCH event study, which allows us to estimate the cumulative abnormal return 
(CAR) and the event-induced variance (EIV). In addition, we perform two cross-sectional tests 
to identify the effect of M&A announcements at the country level.  
We found that M&A announcements can generate positive and negative CARs for acquirers, 
targets, and rivals, which is consistent with the literature. In the cross-sectional test, we found 
that the ACAR of acquirers and rivals is not significantly different from zero. This result suggests 
that M&A announcements in Latin America do not generate or destroy value for acquirers and 
rivals. We observe positive effects for the target, and when motivations do not lead to a strategic 
deal, the result can be negative.  
With regard to the effect on variance, we find that EIV is negative in most cases. Cross-sectional 
test results show that M&A announcements decrease the volatility of acquirer, target, and rival 
stocks. This evidence suggests that, after the announcement, investors' expectations converge, 
and, as a consequence, volatility decreases.  
Finally, we run a multivariate GARCH model to isolate the effect of the M&A announcement 
on the volatility of the acquirer and target stock of co-movements between two banks. The 
model results, at least on the events we study, indicate that even with joint estimates, the effects 
of the announcement of M&As on the volatility of targets and acquirers remain qualitatively the 
same. 
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